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ABSTRACT
UNDER SUPREME COURT REVIEW:
AN EVALUATION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 1994-2005
by
Matthew Coker
University of New Hampshire, September 2012

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is one of the most
controversial courts in the United States due, in large part, to its high rate of reversal
by the United States Supreme Court. The existing scholarship advances several
potential explanations for the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate, particularly the Ninth
Circuit's reputation as a very liberal court. This study evaluates the Ninth Circuit
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court during the 1994-2004 terms to determine
whether there are explanatory patterns to the Supreme Court's disposition of cases
from the Ninth Circuit over time. Examining the effects of the membership of the
original three-judge panel, the presence of a government appellant, and the
application of the due process guarantees, this study identifies substantial differences
between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court.
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CHAPTER I

THE NINTH CIRCUIT CONTROVERSY

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is one of the most
controversial courts in the United States. The Ninth Circuit has a higher rate of reversal
by the Supreme Court than any other circuit court.1 The Ninth Circuit also leads the
federal appeals courts in the number of summary reversals (Supreme Court reversals
without briefing or oral arguments) and unanimous reversals.2 Assessing the Ninth
Circuit's performance, Supreme Court Justice Scalia stated in his letter to the White
Commission that there is a "disproportionate segment of this [Supreme] Court's
discretionary docket that is consistently devoted to reviewing Ninth Circuit judgments
and to reversing them by lop-sided margins."3 The Ninth Circuit's reputation as a
"bastion of liberalism"4 has been reinforced through political, public, and media attention
and controversial rulings such as Newdow v. United States Congress (2002) (on the
Pledge of Allegiance)5 and Compassion in Dying v. Washington (1996) (on physicianassisted suicide).6
While consensus exists within both the legal and the political science
communities as to the existence of the Ninth Circuit's checkered reputation, little
explanatory consensus exists for the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate. Much of the
previous academic work has addressed the circuit's demographics: the characteristics of
circuit size, personnel, and territory that are perceived to most contribute to the circuit's
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reputation. The Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction is the largest territorial allotment amongst the
circuit courts, covering nine states (California, Arizona, Oregon, Washington, Nevada,
Hawaii, Alaska, Montana, and Idaho) and two territories (Guam and the Northern Marina
Islands),7 a contributing factor in both the circuit's heavy case load and its diverse
constituency.8 With twenty-eight authorized active judgeships, the Ninth Circuit is the
largest federal intermediate-appellate court in terms of personnel, having eleven more
judges than the next largest circuit.9 Furthermore, due to its size, the Ninth Circuit is
permitted to use a limited en banc review procedure.10 En banc review normally involves
the rehearing of a three-judge panel decision before the full circuit; the limited en banc
review procedure employed by the Ninth Circuit requires only eleven judges: the chief
judge and ten randomly assigned judges, who may or may not have been members of the
original panel.11 In addition to reflecting larger questions about judicial politics,12 the
Ninth Circuit's reputation as a far-left court is considered a prominent factor in the
Supreme Court's review of the circuit.13 Congress has considered proposals to divide the
circuit for decades, including that by the 1999 Commission on Structural Alternatives for
the Federal Courts of Appeals (the White Commission) study, which recommended the
split.14
Much of the existing scholarship reflects a division between legal analysis (in
which judges are generally considered to be motivated primarily by the application of
existing law), and behavioral political science (in which judges can be considered
political actors advancing policy considerations).15 While the debate over the motivations
of judges can be directed towards any level of the United States' court system, it becomes
especially noteworthy in consideration of the Ninth Circuit because the circuit's
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perceived liberal tendencies factor into most evaluations. Scholars have used both
quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis to assess the performance of the Ninth
Circuit both relative to its sister circuits and to the United States Supreme Court. Most
scholarship focuses on two primary areas of consideration: evaluating the merits of the
Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation and judicial performance or considering the
organizational structure of the Ninth Circuit (the number of judgeships, the limited en
banc procedure).
Examining the Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court for patterns
among those cases offers another avenue for assessing the circuit's performance. Many
factors relating to the Supreme Court's disposition of a case are not illuminated solely by
the reversal statistics. Broader patterns of judicial behavior could potentially be found
within this information. Considerations such as the relevant legal question and
application of particular types of law, the composition of the Ninth Circuit panel, whether
the case was reheard en banc before appeal to the Supreme Court, the vote of the
Supreme Court justices, and whether the United States government or a government
representative was an appellant to the case all offer potential insight into evaluating the
Ninth Circuit's performance as an intermediate level appellate court. Examining the
actual cases reviewed by the Supreme Court, the cases that informed Justice Scalia's
assessment, allows for a greater understanding of the Ninth Circuit's judicial behavior
based on the circuit's output. The circuit's output subject to Supreme Court review offers
a fuller picture of the dynamics between the court levels than the circuit's reversal
statistics alone. Additionally, this approach promotes further insight into the complex
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relationship between the intermediate United States Courts of Appeals System and the
United States Supreme Court at the systemic level.
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CHAPTER II

THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE SUPREME COURT

Each year the Supreme Court reviews and decides with written opinion less than
one percent (1%) of the cases submitted to it, averaging around eighty cases per year.1 In
the October 2009 term (cases heard and decided between October 2009 and September
2010), the Supreme Court affirmed seventeen lower court decisions and reversed sixty'j

five. Of these, four decisions from the Ninth Circuit were affirmed, eleven were reversed
or vacated.3 This 73% reversal rate is a notable improvement over the 88% reversal rate
for the 2008 term, in which fifteen of the seventeen Ninth Circuit cases reviewed were
reversed or vacated,4 or the 96% reversal rate in the 1996 term.5 Statistically, the
Supreme Court is more likely to reverse a lower court decision than to affirm it.6 Yet, the
reversal rate for the Ninth Circuit is consistently among the highest systemwide.7 Ninth
Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain notes that collectively between the 2000 and 2009
terms, the Ninth Circuit was reversed in 148 out of 182 cases heard by the Supreme
Court, 72 of which were unanimous reversals.8 Judge Richard Posner's statistical
comparison of the Ninth Circuit with its sister circuits between 1985 and 1997
demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit leads the circuit courts in the number of summary
reversals, non-summary reversals, and unanimous non-summary reversals.9 While Erwin
Chemerinsky argues that the rate of Ninth Circuit reversals is consistent with the median
of circuit court reversals nationwide;10 a 1984-2004 comparison between the Ninth
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Circuit's reversal rate and the overall reversal rate for all courts shows that the Ninth
Circuit's reversal rate was higher than the overall rate in all but three years.11 In twelve of
those years, the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate exceeded the overall rate by a difference of
greater than 5%, with five years exceeding a 20% difference.12
While these numbers illustrate that the Ninth Circuit is more often than not
reversed upon Supreme Court review, there is extensive debate within the scholarship as
to the merits of assessing a circuit court on its Supreme Court reversal rate. While Posner
and O'Scannlain find the reversal rate to be a significant problem for the Ninth Circuit,13
Stephen Wermiel and Ninth Circuit Senior Judge Jerome Farris argue that reversal
statistics by themselves cannot reflect accurately the performance of any court.14 Both
Stephen Wasby and Marybeth Herald note that, because circuit courts (such as the Ninth
Circuit) are only evaluated on the cases taken directly from their circuit, if the Supreme
Court supports the Ninth Circuit position in a case taken from another circuit, it would
not factor into the statistical analysis of the circuit's term.15 A study by Stefani Lindquist,
Susan Haire, and Donald Songer suggests that the Ninth Circuit may be more closely
observed by the Supreme Court, as they found that the Supreme Court increases its
monitoring of circuits that it has heavily reversed in prior terms.16 They argue that
because the Supreme Court lacks normal organizational means to control the lower
courts, it strategically uses its review resources to maximize its control over the
judiciary.17 They find a number of factors indicate statistically significant increases in
Supreme Court monitoring of a circuit, including previously high Supreme Court
reversal, large numbers of certiorari petitions, increases in en banc hearings and
dissenting opinions, heavy reversal of district courts, and the ideological make-up of the
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circuit.18 These factors support the interpretation that the Ninth Circuit may be singled
out on the basis of reputation, as Lindquist, Haire, and Songer conclude that "the identity
of the circuit is one indicator the Court appears to use in assessing lower court outputs."19
Herald discusses a similar finding in her review of the Supreme Court's 1996 term, which
suggests that the Supreme Court is "micro-managing" the Ninth Circuit.20
The Supreme Court's discretionary docket has been advanced as an explanatory
factor in the amount of attention the Ninth Circuit receives from the Supreme Court. The
Ninth Circuit generates more petitions for certiorari21 than any other circuit court of
appeal;22 which Lindquist, Haire, and Songer find results in increased Supreme Court
auditing. Some scholars have argued that the perceived ideological conflict between the
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court is a result of a Supreme Court shift that the Ninth
Circuit may not be acknowledging (particularly if it has not resulted in changes to
Supreme Court precedent).24 Herald finds that, in the cases reviewed from the Ninth
Circuit during the 1996 term, the Ninth Circuit generally favored the individual against
government, federal government over states, and states except in environmental cases,
while the Supreme Court reversed in favor of government, state governments over
federal, and individuals in cases involving property.25 Kevin Scott's argument that
"higher courts reverse lower courts in pursuit of making broader policy statements;"26
supports the interpretation that the Ninth Circuit is adhering collectively to a different
judicial philosophy than the Supreme Court. This, in turn, generates Supreme Court
attention and precedent-setting reversals. Herald suggests that "the reversed cases have
more to say about the philosophy of the Supreme Court, which has total discretion over
its docket."27
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Evaluating a circuit based on its reversal rate is subject to other limitations,
specifically that there are factors in the disposition of cases that are not considered in the
statistical score.28 One consideration that cannot be discerned from the reversal numbers
is whether the lower court's decision was "wrong" or "different."29 Farris maintains that
judges issue opinions, which are matters of interpretation rather than statements of fact
and that the Ninth Circuit only fails in its performance if it does not thoroughly consider
the case or if it does not follow Supreme Court precedent. Scott finds that precedent
applies less directly to cases at higher level courts due to the complexity of the cases,31
and many Ninth Circuit cases may lack clear precedent, which would be consistent with
Farris' argument. While this distinction can be made for every other intermediate court,32
it does support the hypothesis that the Ninth Circuit may not necessarily be deciding
cases "incorrectly." Chemerinsky argues that, while the Supreme Court is the final
arbitrator of appeals in the United States, a conflicting decision between the Supreme
Court and a circuit court does not necessarily indicate that the lower court's decision was
incorrect in terms of legal reasoning or application.33 He contends that "it is wrong to
equate a reversal with a mistake by the lower court."34 The lower court's decision may
only become "wrong" after the Supreme Court rules differently.35 Herald also finds that
there are cases in which the Supreme Court agrees with the lower court's reasoning but
not the result which still count as reversals.36
Another consideration in evaluating a Ninth Circuit reversal is the margin by
which the Supreme Court reversed the decision. Chemerinsky, Farris, and Wermiel
argue that if the Supreme Court decision was reached by a 5-4 or 6-3 majority, such a
reversal is less likely to indicate a failure by the Ninth Circuit in deciding the case and
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more likely a different application of legal principles.37 However, Posner and Scott
address this consideration by evaluating the Ninth Circuit's high rate of unanimous
reversals,38 with Scott finding that "the Ninth Circuit's proportion of lopsided reversals is
greater than its proportion of reversals decided by a closer vote."39 The Ninth Circuit
leads the circuit court of appeals in unanimous reversals.40
Cases of inter-circuit conflict, in which two or more circuit courts of appeals
reach different results on similar cases, may also be used to evaluate the performance of
the Ninth Circuit.41 Circuit precedents are binding only for the district courts in that
circuit. However, due to the importance of uniformity in federal law, cases in which two
or more circuit courts have established different precedents are strong candidates for
Supreme Court review.42 Though two or more circuits may share a position, only the
circuit from which the case was taken is considered affirmed or reversed.43 Wasby's
study of inter-circuit conflict finds that from 1990-1999, "the Ninth Circuit fared better in
the Supreme Court's rulings on inter-circuit conflicts in cases taken from other courts of
appeals than in Ninth Circuit cases reviewed directly."44 Wasby and Herald argue that the
Ninth Circuit's record improves, albeit only slightly, when these cases are taken into
account45 In cases reviewed directly from the circuit, the Ninth Circuit's position is
sometimes shared by other circuits;46 though Herald documents some cases during the
1996 term in which no other circuit supported the Ninth Circuit's position.47 Interpreting
the results of the term, Herald concludes that "the cases support the argument that the
Ninth Circuit emphasized its own decisions and viewpoints to the exclusion of a broader,
more national approach."48
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The Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate raises concerns because of the implications
the rate has on the status and application of law. Michael Solimine states that, while over
time "there seems to be a homogenization of reputations among the circuits,"49 some
legal commentators, including attorneys and other federal judges, single the Ninth Circuit
out as having a poor reputation.50 Arthur Hellman finds this pattern of reversals raises
doubts about the competency and legitimacy of intermediate court judges.51 Some cases
address issues that the Supreme Court will rule on regardless of the disposition of the
lower court,52 but such cases do not make up the majority of Ninth Circuit decisions.53
Because the Supreme Court reviews such a small percentage of cases, it theoretically
gives circuit court judges the opportunity to decide cases according to their judicial
philosophy and policy goals.54 Farris' argument that "the Supreme Court let stand as final
99.7 percent of Ninth Circuit's 1996 cases,"55 is an indication of the limited nature of
Supreme Court review rather than an affirmation of the Ninth Circuit's performance,56
but it also illustrates a major concern over the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate. Because most
Ninth Circuit decisions will not be subject to Supreme Court review, potentially
"incorrect" decisions could stand without further consideration.57 Debates about judicial
political activity has caught the attention of politicians and the public, such as the
controversy over the Supreme Court's 2009 Citizens United vs. Federal Election
Commission ruling,58 and the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate and controversial cases
are causing considerable interest in that debate.59
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The Ninth Circuit and Politics

In assessing the behavior of circuit court judges, Scott addresses a debate between
political scientists and legal scholars. This debate is between those who argue that judges
are motivated by policy aims and those who argue that judges are motivated by the desire
to make good law.60 Scott cites four factors that indicate that lower court judges are more
interested in making good law than policy: (1) the need to maximize efficiency in the
court system,61 (2) higher court judges hear more complex cases, which may require
additional law,62 (3) precedent applies more directly at lower levels,63 and (4) the desire
of lower court judges for promotion to a higher court position.64 Scott finds that size,
workload, and ideology are significant predictors of a circuit's reversal rate and argues
that smaller and busier circuits are less likely to be reversed because the need for
efficiency limits the opportunity forjudges to create new policy65 A study by Frank
Cross evaluates the circuit court of appeals using four models of judicial decision-making
to determine which factors most influence circuit court judges.66 He determines that the
legal model, which holds that judges make decisions through systematic application of
law, is the most significant factor in influencing circuit court judges.67 However, Cross
acknowledges notable evidence for the political model, which views judges as political
actors who advance their policy preferences, even if they couch those preferences in legal
theory.68 The remaining two models, the strategic model - which suggests that judges
will make decisions to avoid Supreme Court reversal, and the litigant-driven model which suggests that litigants, not judges, drive circuit court precedent, Cross finds to be
of little to no significance.69 Cross argues that the political science verses legal
scholarship debate is ultimately too reductive and that judges are likely to be influenced

by both factors, "acknowledging a material role for politics and strategy injudicial
decision-making does not mean that legal reasoning is necessarily meaningless."
The Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation is a fixture in the debate about whether
judges are more motivated to create law or policy. Consensus exists within the
scholarship that this liberal reputation exists. The debate over the liberal reputation of the
Ninth Circuit instead centers on whether such a reputation is merited and whether that
reputation is related to the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate.71 The circuit's liberal
reputation dates to President Jimmy Carter, who, through the creation of ten additional
judgeships, appointed fifteen judges to the Ninth Circuit during his presidency.72
Wermiel asserts that the connection between the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate and
ideology was started by President Ronald Reagan,73 who appointed four judges to the
Supreme Court, and along with President G.H.W. Bush, fourteen Ninth Circuit judges.74
Susan Haire's study of Ninth Circuit judicial selection finds that Reagan and Bush
appointments were generally utilized to advance policy goals, their appointees are more
ideologically cohesive, while appointments made by Carter and President Bill Clinton
were generally for partisan rather than policy reasons, such as pledges to increase
diversity in the judiciary.75 Haire notes that that Democratic appointees on the Ninth
Circuit are more liberal than Democratic appointees on other circuits.76 Chemerinsky
observes that, in a comparison between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, while
the Supreme Court has justices appointed by Democratic presidents, there are no strong
liberals currently on the Court in the tradition of William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall,
or William Douglas.77 The Ninth Circuit has comparably liberal judges, indicating that its
liberal judges may go further left than any sitting Supreme Court justice.78 While several

13

scholars express reservations about evaluating the liberal-conservative orientation of
judges based on the appointing president, due to factors such as senatorial courtesy, the
non-partisan status of judging, and inconsistency between a judge's ideology and the
ideology of the appointing president, it remains the most accepted evaluation of a judge's
70

ideological preferences.

The merits and satisfactory explanatory capabilities of the Ninth Circuit's liberal
reputation is a source of substantial debate within the scholarship. Some scholars see the
Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation as detrimental to the prestige of the circuit. Wermiel
argues that poor use of statistics by politicians and the media is responsible for the Ninth
Circuit's reputation as a "runaway liberal court;" and argues that a comprehensive
understanding of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the circuit courts is
needed to put the statistics in perspective.80 Wermiel also expresses concern that the
circuit's reputation influences the public's perception of controversial Ninth Circuit
Of
cases. Herald finds that the ideological explanation is inconsistent with the circuit's
current membership,82 while Haire argues that "one cannot label such a large circuit as
being ideologically homogenous."83 In contrast, Posner argues that, if the Ninth Circuit is
more liberal, it would explain the high reversal rate as unrelated to the circuit's
performance.84 Herald, Wermiel, and Farris note that the ideological explanation fails to
account for the Supreme Court's reversals of Ninth Circuit judges appointed by
Republican presidents (who are reversed at a similar rate as Democratic-appointed
judges), and that it overlooks the fact that most three-judge panels involve appointees
from both parties.85 O'Scannlain also rejects the liberal hypothesis.86 In his criticism of
the Ninth Circuit, he argues that the large numbers of unanimous reversals that the Ninth
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Circuit experiences contradicts the ideological claim.87 Studies by Scott and Lindquist,
Haire, and Songer suggest that the Supreme Court does take the circuit ideology into
account in its review of the Ninth Circuit.88 Scott finds that while ideologically
heterogeneous circuits are reversed less frequently, the increased ideological distance
between the circuit court and the Supreme Court increases the number of expected
reversals.89 Herald suggests that "the reversal rate reflects an ideological split that is more
subtle and complicated than political partisanship,"90 which is supported to some degree
by some of the Supreme Court reversals. Both Wermiel and Chemerinsky cite cases in
which the Ninth Circuit took a conservative position, which was later reversed by the
Supreme Court.91 While in some cases, the circuit may issue a broad ruling that is
narrowed and changed by the Supreme Court without necessarily invalidating the
arguments of the original decision.92

The Size of the Ninth Circuit

Congress has established thirteen circuit courts of appeal in the federal court
system: the Federal Circuit (which has a specialized nationwide jurisdiction), the D.C.
circuit, and eleven numbered circuit courts of appeal which are divided into exclusive
Q1
geographical areas. These appellate courts were originally created by the Evarts Act in
1891, with the Tenth and Eleventh circuits being established in 1926 and 1980
respectively.94 The Ninth Circuit is the largest of these circuit courts, both in terms of
territory and the number of authorized judgeships.95 Some scholars hypothesize that the
Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate can be attributed to its size and to the mechanisms, such
as the limited en banc hearing, by which the circuit functions. Scholarship on the size of
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the Ninth Circuit is frequently set against the backdrop of the continuing debate over
whether the Ninth Circuit is too large to function properly, and if so, whether the circuit
should be divided.
The size of the Ninth Circuit is cited frequently as a factor in explaining the Ninth
Circuit's high reversal rate. The Ninth Circuit handles more cases per year than any other
circuit court.96 Herald argues that Congress' delays in filling vacancies on the Ninth
Circuit contributes to the circuit's reversal rate because "eighteen judges [in 1997] are
expected to do the work of twenty-eight."97 Posner argues that the size of the circuit
affects judicial quality on the Ninth Circuit because informal norms of quality control do
not work as well in larger groups.

QO

Posner's analysis finds that problems with the quality

of judicial decision-making increase with the size of a circuit, and that adding judgeships
reduces the judicial quality of the circuit.99 Some criticisms of the Ninth Circuit suggest
that the size of the Ninth Circuit prevents the judges from maintaining circuit
consistency, in that the Ninth Circuit may establish contradictory rulings with its own
circuit precedent.100 However, Hellman's analysis of the Ninth Circuit's en banc process
argues that the consistency hypothesis is unfounded, finding that the evidence indicates
that "Ninth Circuit judges engage in extensive monitoring of their colleagues
decisions."101 Hellman's findings that the Ninth Circuit judges extensively review circuit
activity supports Herald's conclusion that the Ninth Circuit may be eschewing a national
approach to focus on its own circuit precedent.102 Hellman finds that many judges on the
Ninth Circuit are committed to the principle of panel autonomy and believe that "panels
should be given wide leeway to resolve issues, even important ones, on which there is no
controlling authority."103 Scott's statistical analysis concludes that "the size of the circuit
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is not strongly related to the frequency of reversal,"104 and that the Ninth Circuit's
reversal rate cannot be explained solely by its size.105
The limited en banc procedure used only by the Ninth Circuit is frequently
considered the most prominent size-related explanation of the circuit's reversal rate.
Normally, en banc hearings are held after the three-judge panel has issued its ruling,
usually at the request of other judges on the circuit.106 Judges on the circuit can initiate en
banc procedures through a variety of means and, from 1994-1998, Ninth Circuit judges
(who did not serve on the original panel) initiated en banc activity in 420 cases.107 The
Supreme Court urges circuits to rehear cases en banc when the panel ruling: (1) conflicts
with circuit precedent,

1Dfi

(2) conflicts with Supreme Court rulings,

1 AO

or (3) involves

issues of "exceptional importance."110 Studies by Wasby and Lindquist, Haire, and
Songer suggest that rehearing a case en banc may attract Supreme Court attention.111
Wasby also finds that many cases that are candidates for en banc hearing are cases the
Supreme Court is likely to review anyway.112 The Ninth Circuit is permitted to use the
limited en banc procedure through a congressional statute; provisions for full court
review exist, but have not been exercised.113 Scott finds that the limited en banc
procedure has a greater impact on the outcome of Ninth Circuit cases than the circuit's
size.114 While Hellman acknowledges that the limited en banc occasionally fails to
correct decisions that the full en banc review might, his statistical analysis indicates an
80% probability of the limited en banc matching a full en banc.115 His results indicate that
the limited en banc review generally supports the majority view of the circuit's judges.116
Hellman finds that increased use of the en banc procedure does benefit the Ninth Circuit
117
cases during Supreme Court review. While Wasby acknowledges that Ninth Circuit en
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banc cases reviewed by the Supreme Court fared better than Ninth Circuit panel
decisions, he argues that there is little evidence that en banc hearings in general affect the
Supreme Court's disposition of a case compared to only holding a panel hearing.118

Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit has been subject to comparatively more scholarship than its
sister circuits. Both political scientists and legal scholars continue to explore potential
explanations for the circuit's high reversal rate, the merits of its liberal reputation, and the
effects, if any, of the circuit's size. No single factor cited has explained conclusively the
Ninth Circuit's checkered reputation and years of frequent Supreme Court reversal.
While the Ninth Circuit is reversed more often by the Supreme Court than any
other circuit court, and has had years of extremely high reversal, the reversal rate
functions mostly as a signal of a problem under Supreme Court review. The reversal rate
alone lacks explanatory power. Factors such as the nature of judicial decision-making,
inter-circuit conflict cases, and the Supreme Court's discretionary docket, reduce the
authority of the statistical score. Farris maintains that circuit courts should not be driven
by the risk of reversal: "the danger is not that an appellate court gets reversed, but that a
court might let possible reversal deter decisive, full, and reasoned consideration of
important issues."119 Similarly, in his analysis of judicial behavior, Cross finds that the
risk of reversal has little influence on the behavior of intermediate court judges.120
However, some scholars acknowledge, even those who reject reliance on reversal
statistics, that the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate casts doubt upon whether the circuit
is functioning properly. Both Cross and Scott acknowledge the division between
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disciplines about the extent to which judges are influenced by politics.121 Cross' analysis
concludes that, even as judges are primarily motivated by law, they are influenced, if
even subconsciously, by politics.

i "yy

The Ninth Circuit is not homogenous ideologically. While the circuit's liberal
reputation at one time could be attributed mostly to the large proportion of Carter
appointees, many of those appointees are no longer active judges,123 and that reputation
has persisted through the appointments of Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton, and G.W.
Bush. The "liberal judge" theory, that holds that the Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation is
the product of circuit dominance by a large number of liberal judges, is the most common
manifestation of the liberal reputation assessment. The assessment suggests that the
disconnect between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, as demonstrated by the
high reversal rate, is a function of more liberal Ninth Circuit judges being overruled by
more conservative Supreme Court justices. Herald's argument of a more complex
ideological gap between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court during the 1996 term124
and Hellman's conclusion that the Ninth Circuit is primarily internally focused125 each
suggest a philosophical difference injudicial approach between the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court that is a more sophisticated explanation of the circuit's behavior than the
"liberal judge" theory.
Analysis of the effects of the Ninth Circuit's size upon its reversal rate has to be
positioned against the backdrop of the politically contentious debate over proposals to
divide the circuit. If the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate is primarily an effect of its
territorial or judicial size, than some credibility attaches to the suggestion that splitting
the circuit would improve its performance upon Supreme Court review. Posner argues
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based on statistical evidence that the substantial size of the Ninth Circuit affects the
quality of its judicial output.126 However, statistical analysis by Scott and Hellman
suggests that the experiences of the Ninth Circuit cannot be reduced solely to the question
of circuit size.127 While Scott's analysis finds the limited en banc procedure was more
problematic than circuit size,128 Hellman argues that Ninth Circuit judges continue to
extensively monitor circuit output and that the limited en banc review procedure
functions largely at similar efficiency to a full en banc review.129
Different theories relating to size, ideology, and statistical relevance have been
addressed through qualitative and quantitative means to evaluate the reputation and
judicial performance of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No single element
has been found to explain conclusively why the Ninth Circuit generally fares poorly upon
Supreme Court review. A period study of the Ninth Circuit cases that were reviewed by
the Supreme Court might offer insight into the relationship between the Supreme Court
and the Ninth Circuit by looking for particular patterns among those cases. Herald's
analysis of the 1996 term provides a substantial amount of detail relating to the cases
reviewed by the Supreme Court, but it was an in-depth review of a notoriously difficult
term, in which the Ninth Circuit was reversed in all but one case. This study analyzes the
interaction between the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit across an extended period;
rather than a detailed assessment of cases, this study looks for patterns among the
disposition of the cases, the Supreme Court vote, the panel composition, specific legal
questions, and whether the government was a party to the case across several years of full
terms. This research attempts to get a broader picture of the Ninth Circuit's performance
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under Supreme Court review rather than focusing on one or more particular facets of the
Ninth Circuit.
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CHAPTER III

SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

This paper examines the relationship between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court by analyzing the Ninth Circuit cases the Supreme Court accepted for review over
eleven Supreme Court terms, from 1994 to 2004. Supreme Court terms begin in October
and officially conclude in September of the following year.1 Most decisions are issued by
the end of June. This approach allows for a complete evaluation of the Ninth Circuit
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court, those in which a writ of certiorari was granted,
over the period of this study, rather than focusing on selected notable cases or specific
attributes of the Supreme Court's docket. This study considers the Supreme Court's
review under Chief Justice Rehnquist from October Term 1994, when Justice Breyer
joined the Court, to October Term 2004, the last term served by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
The stability of the Supreme Court's membership during this period minimizes the effect
of Supreme Court composition as an intervening variable in this analysis.
The cases used in this study were collected from the printed version of the United
States Reports, Volumes 513 to 545. Three volumes are published for each Supreme
Court term covering the cases chronologically in order of decision. These are the official
records of United States Supreme Court decisions. All cases in which a writ of certiorari
was granted to a case originating from the Ninth Circuit were included in this data set for
analysis. The Supreme Court reviewed 206 cases from the Ninth Circuit from the 1994
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term through the 2004 term. 203 resulted in a Supreme Court decision, either with full
consideration (with briefing and oral argument) or summary consideration (without
briefing or oral argument).4 In two cases: Grimmett v. Brown 519 U.S. 233 (1996 Term)
and Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley 537 U.S. 1 (2002 Term), the writ of certiorari was
dismissed, and in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership 513 U.S. 18
(1994 Term) the case was dismissed as moot. The case name and citation number, the
Supreme Court disposition, the Supreme Court vote, the legal question considered by the
Supreme Court, and whether the government was a party to the case as either an appellant
or appellee were recorded from each case within the study period. This information was
subsequently checked against the records of the Oyez Project, an online legal reference
site from the Chicago-Kent School of Law for completeness and accuracy.5 The Ninth
Circuit decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court were accessed from Justia.com, which
provided the make-up of the original Ninth Circuit panel and the en banc panel
composition if applicable.6
This study utilizes the following variables to examine the Supreme Court's review
of Ninth Circuit cases:
DISPOSITION: The action taken by the Supreme Court after review of
the Ninth Circuit case. Cases are either "Affirmed," "Reversed"
(Reversed decisions can be remanded to the lower court), "Vacated"
(Vacated decisions can be remanded to the lower court), "Affirmed in
Part, Reversed in Part" (these cases can also be remanded to the lower
court). For the purposes of this study, "Reversed" and "Vacated" are
treated as the same disposition, as both outcomes signal Supreme Court
disagreement with the Ninth Circuit decision. Whether a case was
remanded to the lower court was not considered in this variable apart from
documentation.
VOTE: The Supreme Court vote. The majority of decisions issued by the
Supreme Court include the votes of all nine sitting Supreme Court justices.
Votes in which one or more justices did not participate in the decision
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were documented by their own numeric code for the statistical analysis.
Votes were coded from "1" indicating a 9-0 vote, to "11" indicating a 4-4
vote. While Supreme Court rules permit justices the option to sign onto
only selected sections of opinions, for statistical efficiency, only approval
and dissent were considered in coding the vote for each case. Concurring
opinions are included in the majority vote count. Per curiam decisions
(summary reversals) are documented by their own numeric code in the
statistical analysis.
GOVERNMENT AS PARTY: Whether government was a party to the
case as either an appellant or an appellee. "Government" refers to any
form of government or government agent within the United States: this
includes, but is not limited to, the United States as a party, any state within
the United States, counties or cities within the United States, federal or
state administrative agents, local law enforcement, district attorneys, or
county officials. Cases involving Guam or U.S. territories were not coded
as government cases. The government variable is coded "1" if the
government is a party to the case and the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the government. The variable is coded "2" if the government is a party to
the case and the Supreme Court did not rule in favor of the government.
The variable is coded "3" if the government was not a party to the case,
and coded "4" if the government was a party on both sides (such as a
state-local or a federal-state) dispute. Cases in which the government files
an amicus brief but was not actually a party to the case are coded "3;"
while the government may have had a legal interest in the outcome it was
not directly involved in the case.
DUE PROCESS: Whether the legal question in the case involved Due
Process law. For the purposes of this analysis, "due process" is defined as
any legal matter than invokes a legal due process guarantee (this includes
criminal procedure cases that don't explicitly cite the due process clause)
with the government as a party to the case. Due process cases that involve
criminal guarantees (such as the Fourth Amendment) are coded separately
from due process cases involving civil guarantees (such as the Fifth
Amendment "takings clause").
EQUAL PROTECTION: Whether the legal question in the case involved
the Equal Protection clause. For the purposes of this analysis, "equal
protection" is defined as any legal matter that invokes the equal protection
guarantee in which the government is a party to the case. Civil rights
cases involving private parties (such as employment discrimination)
without the government as a party are not coded as equal protection cases.
PANEL: The make-up of the original Ninth Circuit panel decision, coded
by appointing presidential party. This study does not attempt to rate the
ideological orientation of individual judges, it documents only whether the
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judges on the panel were appointed by a Democratic or a Republican
president. Appointment information was retrieved from the Federal
Judicial Center database, which includes service information for federal
judges, whether currently or no longer serving.7 Panel composition can
include three judges all appointed by either Democratic presidents or
Republican presidents, panels made up of two Democratic appointees and
one Republican appointee, or two Republican appointees and one
Democratic appointee. This variable focused on the composition of the
panel that issued the opinion, dissenting panel opinions were not included
in the analysis. Whether a panel decision was reheard en banc is also
documented by this variable, coded "5," as the Supreme Court decision
refers to the en banc opinion in these cases, these cases are excluded from
panel analysis.
EN BANC: Whether the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc prior to
review by the Supreme Court. As the Supreme Court decision refers to
the Ninth Circuit en banc decision on these cases, the composition of the
original panel was excluded from the statistical analysis.

Hypotheses

The purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between the Ninth Circuit
and the Supreme Court based on the Supreme Court's review of cases originating from
the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit has generated public and political interest due to its
significantly high reversal rate; the most pressing explanations for the reversal rate relate
to the Ninth Circuit's judicial performance. To best evaluate the relationship between the
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, this study focuses on three distinct, but related
areas, in which the Ninth Circuit may be differing substantively from the Supreme Court:
the composition of the Ninth Circuit panel, the treatment of government appellants or
appellees, and the application of Due Process guarantees. This study evaluates the
following three hypotheses:
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HI: The more Democratic-appointedjudges on the Ninth Circuit panel, the more
likely the Supreme Court is to reverse the decision.
This is an empirical test of the "liberal judge" theory. The "liberal judge" theory
holds that the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate can be attributed to the circuit being
dominated by liberal judges (initially Carter appointees), resulting in an ideological
disagreement between more liberal Ninth Circuit judges and more conservative Supreme
Court judges. This hypothesis tests the effect of political identification. While subject to
limitations, the appointing presidential party is the most frequently accepted proxy for
evaluating a judge's ideology.8 While this study does not attempt to define the ideologies
of individual judges, this study considers judges appointed by Democratic presidents,
such as Carter or Clinton, to be more liberal than judges appointed by Republican
presidents, such as Reagan or H.W. Bush. If the "liberal judge" theory is correct, we
should expect to see higher reversal rates for panels that include more Democraticappointed judges. We should expect to see panels that include more Republican judges
reversed less frequently.
Ninth Circuit cases are heard by panels that include active judges (judges in full
service assigned to the Ninth Circuit,) senior judges (judges who are no longer in active
service, but continue to hear cases,) and visiting judges (judges from other courts
assigned to a Ninth Circuit panel.)9 Ninth Circuit panel selection procedures are designed
to ensure that panels are composed of different combinations of judges, and that judges
work regularly with other judges from the circuit.10 Section 3.2 of the General Orders for
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit requires that all panels include at
least two judges assigned to the circuit, one of whom must be in active service.11 Each
judge is expected to hear eight monthly calendars of five panels each yearly, with each
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active judge sitting with each other active judge and each senior judge the same number
of times over a two year period to the extent possible.12 Cases remanded to the Ninth
Circuit after review from the Supreme Court are heard by the same panel as the original
Ninth Circuit decision to the extent possible.13
As a test of political ideology, the "liberal judge" theory can additionally be
evaluated by the Supreme Court vote. While Posner finds that the Ninth Circuit leads the
circuit courts in terms of unanimous reversals,14 if the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate can be
attributed to differences in political ideology, we should still expect to see ideological
splits between the liberal and conservative justices on the Supreme Court in a majority of
cases. A large number of Supreme Court rulings that are unanimous or near unanimous
would signal undivided Supreme Court disagreement with the Ninth Circuit ruling,
suggesting a disagreement not based in political ideology.
This hypothesis was tested by running a cross-tabulations analysis that used the
Ninth Circuit panel composition as the independent variable and the Supreme Court's
disposition of the case as the dependent variable. The Supreme Court reversed far more
of the 203 cases than it affirmed (either in whole or in part) and the reversal statistic is the
largest group for more detailed analysis. The Supreme Court vote was analyzed using
frequency charts. A cross-tabulations analysis that used the Supreme Court vote as the
independent variable and the disposition as the dependent variable was also conducted.
The vote variable was utilized in two ways. The original vote variable was the
Supreme Court vote as it appeared in the United States Report numerically coded; for
statistical efficiency, only approval and dissent were measured - if a justice signed onto
to selected parts of the majority decision or filed a concurring opinion, it was coded as an
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approval. Most of the votes involved all nine sitting Supreme Court justices, but votes of
4-4, 7-1,6-2 did occur infrequently throughout the period evaluated. These also were
measured to obtain the most complete record of the Supreme Court's evaluation possible.
A re-coded vote variable was created using the statistical analysis software to allow for
simplified analysis of the Supreme Court vote: (Near) Unanimous (9-0, 8-1, and 8-0
decisions), Large Margins (in which 7 justices are on one side), Clear Majority (6-3 or 62 decisions), and Split Votes (5-4, 5-3,4-4 decisions). A cross-tabulations analysis,
testing disposition as the dependent variable and re-coded Supreme Court vote as the
independent variable was also conducted.

H2: If the government is party to the case, the Supreme Court is more likely
to reverse the Ninth Circuit in favor of the government.
In Herald's study of the 1996 term, Herald argues that the Supreme Court was
more likely than the Ninth Circuit to rule in favor of the government.15 This hypothesis is
an extrapolation of Herald's findings to assess whether the relationship Herald found in
the 1996 term persists across several Supreme Court terms. If the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court treat "government as appellant" cases differently, it could indicate a
difference injudicial philosophy or judicial priority that extends beyond considering one
court more ideologically liberal. While the "liberal judge" hypothesis tests the effect of
judges' political orientations, this test of the treatment of government appellants in the
Ninth Circuit and in the Supreme Court examines more complex facets of judicial
behavior. This study treated all government appellants or appellees that appear as sole
government party to the case equally; whether the appellant in question was the United
States government, a state, or an administrative agency official. This treatment was
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intended to measure how the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court respond to
government appellants, rather than how the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court respond
to a particular level of government. Additionally, applications of federal law originate at
different levels of government. For example, most criminal procedure cases list the
prison warden, a state level official, as party to the case.
This hypothesis was tested by cross-tabulation analysis that used government as
party as the independent variable and Supreme Court disposition as the dependent
variable.

H3: The Ninth Circuit is more likely to be reversed in cases that involve
Due Process guarantees applied to criminal cases.
The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit address a vast range of legal questions.
The legal questions considered during the period of this study encompassed, as a small
sample, federal agency jurisdiction, employment discrimination claims, application of
disability law, death penalty appeals, foreign sovereignty, First Amendment questions.
Very few of the specific legal questions were addressed frequently enough during the
period of this study to provide a statistically rich analysis of a particular type of case.
Analyzing the application of Due Process guarantees in criminal cases involve a variety
of legal questions, but still permit the analysis of possible differences in how the Supreme
Court and the Ninth Circuit treat a particular classification of cases. This hypothesis
further tests differences injudicial philosophy between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court as based in the application of a particular type of law.
The Due Process hypothesis was evaluated using a layered cross-tabulation
analysis with government as party as the independent variable, Supreme Court
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disposition as the dependent variable, and Due Process as the layer variable. Because the
definition of the Due Process variable includes government as a party to the case, the
government as an appellant or appellee is used as the independent variable for this
analysis. Cases in which the government was not a party to the case, or cases in which
the government was a party on both sides of the case were not included in this analysis.
This study had attempted to measure the application of the Equal Protection
clause between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court; however, there were only
twelve cases within the study period that met the criteria for being equal protection cases.
This is too small a sample to provide viable analysis.
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CHAPTER IV

ASSESSING THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The Supreme Court accepted 206 cases from the Ninth Circuit between the 1994
term and the 2004 term; the Supreme Court issued a ruling in 203 of those cases. The
vast majority of the Ninth Circuit decisions (78.2% or 161 cases) reviewed by the
Supreme Court were reversed or vacated (see Table 1/Figure 1).

Frequency
Valid

Affirmed
Affirmed In Part /

Percent

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

37

18.0

18.0

18.0

5

2.4

2.4

20.4

161

78.2

78.2

98.5

3

1.5

1.5

100.0

206

100.0

100.0

Reversed In Part
Reversed/Vacated
Certiorari Dismissed
Total

Table 1: Case Disposition of Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court 1994-2005
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Figure 1: Case Disposition of Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court 1994-2005
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More Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court were decided by
unanimous votes than by close votes, even when the cases decided by a 5-4 and by a 6-3
vote are combined. Among the 203 cases in which the Supreme Court issued a decision,
41.7% of those cases were decided by a 9-0 vote, compared to 14.1% of cases decided by
a 5-4 vote. The number of unanimous Supreme Court reversals (by a 9-0 or 8-0 vote) far
exceeds the number of "close-vote" (5-4) reversals. Most of the unanimously decided
cases were reversals (81.4%). Twenty-six cases were reversed by per curiam opinions
(see Table 2/Figure 2).

Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

86

41.7

42.2

42.2

8-1

13

6.3

6.4

48.5

8-0

5

2.4

2.5

51.0

7-2

18

8.7

8.8

59.8

7-1

2

1.0

1.0

60.8

7-0

1

.5

.5

61.3

6-3

20

9.7

9.8

71.1

6-2

2

1.0

1.0

72.1

5-4

29

14.1

14.2

86.3

5-3

1

.5

.5

86.8

4-4

1

.5

.5

87.3

26

12.6

12.7

100.0

204

99.0

100.0

2

1.0

206

100.0

Total

Total

Valid Percent

9-0

Per curiam

Missing

Percent

System

Table 2: Supreme Court vote on Ninth Circuit cases, 1994-2005
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Figure 2: Supreme Court vote on Ninth Circuit cases, 1994-2005

The re-coded vote variable (which sorted the Supreme Court vote into (Near)
Unanimous, Large Margins, Clear Majority, and Split Vote categories) demonstrates
further patterns in the Supreme Court's review of the Ninth Circuit. Most reversals were
decided by (near) unanimous margins (83.7%). Cases in which the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit was affirmed were more likely to be decided by a split vote (35.5%) or a clear
majority vote (31.8%) than by a (near) unanimous or large margin vote (see Table 3).
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Vote - 4 Categories

Affirmed

Case
Disposition

(Near)

Large

Clear

Unanimous

Margin

Majority

Count
% within Vote

Affirmed In Part /

Count

Reversed In Part

% within Vote

Reversed/Vacated

Count
% within Vote

Certiorari Dismissed

Count
% within Vote

Total

Count
% within Vote

Split

Total

13

6

7

11

37

12.5%

28.6%

31.8%

35.5%

20.8%

3

0

1

1

5

2.9%

.0%

4.5%

3.2%

2.8%

87

15

14

19

135

83.7%

71.4%

63.6%

61.3%

75.8%

1

0

0

0

1

1.0%

.0%

.0%

.0%

.6%

104

21

22

31

178

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Table 3: Case Disposition by Vote

The findings relating to case disposition are consistent with the Ninth Circuit's
reputation. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed or vacated more of the Ninth
Circuit decisions than it affirmed. The reversal rate is more of a signal than a defining
statistic. It has been argued that, in terms of reversal, the Ninth Circuit potentially may
not be distinct from other appellate courts;1 the Supreme Court generally reverses more
cases than it affirms.2 As the Supreme Court's discretionary docket allows the Court
complete control over the cases it accepts for review, most of its opinions aim to clarify a
rule of law or to correct what the Court perceives as a wayward ruling.3 However, as the
Supreme Court averages around eighty cases per year,4 the 206 cases accepted from the
Ninth Circuit during the eleven year period of this study support the interpretation that
the Ninth Circuit generates a substantial amount of attention from the Supreme Court.
Frequent review and reversal reflects poorly upon the Ninth Circuit. Even if, to some
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degree, reversal is consistent with the expectations of higher court review, the Ninth
Circuit occupies a considerable portion of the Supreme Court's caseload.
The proportion of unanimous reversals is a more revealing statistic than the
reversal rate as a means of evaluating the Ninth Circuit's performance. The Rehnquist
Supreme Court was ideologically diverse, and generally perceived as split politically. If
the majority of the Supreme Court reversals were by 5-4 or 6-3 votes (along ideological
lines), the argument could be sustained that the reversal rate is a function of ideology
rather than performance. However, even when the number of cases decided by 5-4 and
6-3 Supreme Court votes were combined, the Ninth Circuit was more frequently
overturned by unanimous decisions. Unanimous reversals, which require collective
agreement from the ideologically diverse Supreme Court justices, signal a strong
disagreement in legal reasoning rather than a disagreement in political ideology between
the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. The frequency of unanimous reversals
weakens the argument that the difference between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court can be expressed as a function of politics.
The cross-tabulations analysis of the Ninth Circuit panel composition indicates
that the inclusion of Republican-appointed judges on a panel does not decrease the
incidence of the Supreme Court reversing the Ninth Circuit panel. There were 52 cases
in this study in which the Ninth Circuit panel was composed entirely of Democraticappointed judges. These panels were reversed in 76.9% of cases. The reversal rate is
similar for the 75 panels comprised of two Democratic-appointed judges and one
Republican-appointed judge which were reversed in 81.3% of cases, and the 52 panels of
two Republican-appointed judges and one Democratic-appointed judge, which were
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reversed in 82.7% of cases. While a notable drop in the reversal rate exists for panels of
entirely Republican-appointed judges (60%), there were only 10 such panels, not reheard
en banc, during the period tested in this study, which is too small a sample from which to
derive statistically meaningful results (see Table 4/Figure 3).

Panel, Bv Appointing Presidential Party

Case

Affirmed

Count

Disposition

% within Panel
Affirmed In Part /

Count

Reversed In Part

% within Panel

Reversed/Vacated

Count
% within Panel

Certiorari Dismissed

Count
% within Panel

Total

Count
% within Panel

2 Democrat-

1 Democrat-

3

Appointed, 1

Appointed, 2

3

Democrat-

Republican-

Republican-

Republican

Reheard

Appointed

Appointed

Appointed

-Appointed

En Banc

Total

11

10

9

4

3

37

21.2%

13.3%

17.3%

40.0%

21.4%

18.2%

1

3

0

0

1

5

1.9%

4.0%

.0%

.0%

7.1%

2.5%

40

61

43

6

10

160

76.9%

81.3%

82.7%

60.0%

71.4%

78.8%

0

1

0

0

0

1

.0%

1.3%

.0%

.0%

.0%

.5%

52

75

52

10

14

203

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Table 4: Cross-tabulation Table: Case Disposition by Panel Make-up
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Figure 3: Case Disposition by Panel Make-up

Fourteen panel decisions were reheard en banc by the Ninth Circuit prior to
Supreme Court review throughout the period of this study. These cases were omitted
from the statistical tests on panel composition because the Supreme Court's ruling
applied to the en banc decision rather than the original panel decision. As a group, this
sample is too small for statistically significant analysis, but a breakdown of the panel
composition indicates that of the fourteen cases reheard en banc: 1 case was originally
decided by a panel of three Democratic-appointed judges, 1 case was originally decided
by a panel with 2 Democratic-appointed judges and 1 Republican-appointed judge, 9
cases were from panels of 2 Republican-appointed judges and 1 Democratic-appointed
judges, and 3 cases were originally decided by panels of three Republican-appointed
judges. The Supreme Court reversed ten of the cases reheard en banc by the Ninth
Circuit.
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In order for the "liberal judge" hypothesis to be demonstrated, an inverse
relationship should exist between the Ninth Circuit panel composition and the Supreme
Court's disposition of the case. As the number of Republican-appointed judges on the
panel increases, the reversal rate should decrease. While the number of panels composed
entirely of Republican-appointed judges was not sufficient for statistically relevant results
(there were ten throughout the period of the study), an ample number of cases from
panels composed entirely of Democratic-appointed judges, panels of 2 Democraticappointed judges and 1 Republican-appointed judge, and 2 Republican-appointed judges
and 1 Democratic-appointed judge were documented to observe the relationship between
panel composition and the reversal rate. The reversal rate is consistent across the
different panel compositions, panels composed of 2 Republican-appointed judges and 1
Democrat-appointed judge are reversed at the same (slightly but not statistically
significantly higher) rate as panels composed entirely of Democratic-appointed judges.
While the comparable lack of panels made up entirely by Republican-appointed judges
(10 panels composed of 3 Republican-appointed judges verses 52 panels composed of 3
Democratic-appointed judges) suggests a prevalence of Democratic-appointed judges in
the circuit, this is a function of demographics rather than an explanation of judicial
performance. The results of the cross-tabulations analysis indicate, assuming
Democratic-appointed judges are accepted as being more liberal than Republicanappointed judges, that panel composition does not necessarily improve the Ninth
Circuit's performance under Supreme Court review. Even with more Democraticappointed judges in the circuit, this test should demonstrate a difference in the reversal
rate between panels with a majority of Republican-appointed judges and panels with a
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majority of Democratic-appointed judges. The consistency of the reversal rate across
panel composition weakens the political ideology argument as an explanation for the
Ninth Circuit's performance. It also indicates that the "liberal judge" hypothesis, that the
Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate is a function of too many liberal judges, does not
withstand scrutiny statistically.
The consistency of the reversal rate across different types of panel composition
and the proportion of unanimous Supreme Court reversals indicates that the possible
disconnect between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court is more complex than
simply a conflict between a conservative-dominated Supreme Court and a liberaldominated Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A unanimous reversal demonstrates that,
across ideological lines, the Supreme Court expresses significant disagreement with the
Ninth Circuit's decision. Furthermore, panels dominated by Republican-appointed
judges are reversed at a similar rate as panels dominated by Democratic-appointed
judges. This indicates that the "liberal judge" hypothesis, taken as a function of
ideological explanation, cannot account for the frequency of Supreme Court reversal.
A distinction should be made between an ideological explanation of judicial
behavior and a philosophical one. Based on the results of this statistical analysis, framing
the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate in ideological terms (Democrat-appointee vs.
Republican-appointee, liberal vs. conservative) does not adequately explain its poor
performance under Supreme Court review. The relationship between the Ninth Circuit
and the Supreme Court cannot be reduced to disagreement between a Democraticappointment dominated circuit court and a Republican-appointment dominated high
court. However, liberal and conservative differences in judicial behavior can be
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exercised in non-ideological (non-partisan) ways, such as how the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit approach different types of legal questions. A substantial difference in
judicial philosophy could explain how the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate crosses
ideological lines.
Based on the cross-tabulations analysis, when the government (federal, state,
county, or local) as a party or a government representative was a party to a case, the
Supreme Court frequently reversed the Ninth Circuit in favor of the government. 92% of
cases in which the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government were cases in which
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Cases in which the Supreme Court ruled
against the government were more evenly split between affirmed Ninth Circuit decisions
(41.5%) and reversed Ninth Circuit decisions (53.7%) (see Table 5).

Government Party
Government Government

Case

Affirmed

Disposition

Count
% within Party

Party,

Party,

Government

Prevailed

Against

Party

Total

8

17

10

35

7.1%

41.5%

22.7%

17.7%

1

2

2

5

Affirmed In Part /

Count

Reversed In Part

% within Party

.9%

4.9%

4.5%

2.5%

Reversed/Vacated

Count

104

22

31

157

92.0%

53.7%

70.5%

79.3%

0

0

1

1

% within Party

.0%

.0%

2.3%

.5%

Count

113

41

44

198

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

% within Party
Certiorari Dismissed

Total

No

Count

% within Party

Table 5: Cross-tabulation Table: Case Disposition with Government Appellant or Appellee
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The results of this analysis support the argument from Herald's study of the 1996
term.5 The Supreme Court is much more favorable to the government appellant than the
Ninth Circuit. In the vast majority of cases in which the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the government, it reversed the Ninth Circuit. When the Supreme Court ruled against the
government, the Ninth Circuit's performance was more evenly split between decisions
affirmed and decisions reversed. As a broader pattern of judicial behavior, the Ninth
Circuit appears to be inclined largely to disfavor the government. The Supreme Court
frequently counters this approach, as demonstrated by the correlation between Supreme
Court rulings favorable to the government appellant or appellee that were cases in which
the Ninth Circuit was reversed. When the Supreme Court ruling is not favorable to the
government appellant or appellee, the percentage of cases in which the Ninth Circuit is
reversed decreases significantly. This further suggests the possibility that the original
Ninth Circuit ruling was not favorable to government, as these cases are upheld more
frequently when the Supreme Court rules against the government appellant or appellee
than when the Supreme Court rules in the government's favor.
The substantial difference in the treatment of government appellants and appellees
between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court is supportive of a difference injudicial
philosophy argument. Without resorting to an overtly partisan distinction, the Supreme
Court significantly favors government appellants, frequently reversing the Ninth Circuit
in cases in which the original Ninth Circuit decision presumably was not favorable to the
government.
Noted as recently as the 2010 term, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit
frequently clash over the treatment of criminal procedure cases.6 Examining the
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application of the Due Process clause during the period of this study allows for insight
into the differences between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court on the application
of legal principles. While the definition of criminal Due Process, that the case invokes a
legal due process guarantee with the government as a party to the case, is sufficiently
broad to encompass a range of different legal questions, it is specific enough in its focus
to illustrate if differences injudicial approach exist. 79 cases involved the application of
a due process guarantee in a criminal procedure case. In the vast majority of these cases
(70 cases, 88.6%), the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. In nearly all cases (63
of 65 cases, or 96.9%) that involved a criminal procedure application of a due process
guarantee where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government appellant or
appellee, the Ninth Circuit decision was reversed or vacated. Cases that involved a
criminal procedure application of due process not ruled in favor of the government were
more evenly split, six cases affirmed, seven cases reversed (see Table 6).

Government Party Outcome

Does Case Involve Due Process Clause
Involves Due

Case

Process -

Disposition

Criminal

Affirmed

Count
% within Outcome

Affirmed In Part /

Count

Reversed In Part

% within Outcome

ReversedA/acated

Count
% within Outcome

Total

Count
% within Outcome

Government

Government

Party,

Party,

Prevailed

Against

Total

2

6

8

3.1%

42.9%

10.1%

0

1

1

.0%

7.1%

1.3%

63

7

70

96.9%

50.0%

88.6%

65

14

79

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Table 6: Cross-tabulation Table: Case Disposition by Government Party in Due Process Cases
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The Supreme Court's rejection of the Ninth Circuit's approach in due process
related cases signals a strong disagreement between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court injudicial approach. While Due Process law is not overtly partisan in nature,
differences in criminal procedure cases can be defined in liberal and conservative terms.
Consistent with the differences between the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit in their
approach towards government appellants and appellees, the differences injudicial
behavior demonstrated by the Due Process tests suggests a philosophical gap between the
courts that cannot be defined in ideological terms.
The results of this analysis indicate that the relationship between the Ninth Circuit
and the Supreme Court is more complicated than the liberal Ninth Circuit reputation
permits at face value. The consistency of reversal across panel composition and the
frequency of unanimous reversal signal that the disparity between the Ninth Circuit and
the Supreme Court is not simply a function of the "liberal justice" hypothesis. It could
indicate another manifestation of the Ninth Circuit's liberalism that is more sophisticated
than a dominance of liberal justices. Strong reversal statistics for the analysis of
government as a party to the case and the application of the due process clause indicate a
substantial difference in approach between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court on
these types of cases.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Previous studies of the Ninth Circuit have focused on analyzing different
characteristics of the circuit court as explanatory variables for the Ninth Circuit's
controversial reputation. Much of the scholarship focuses on two primary explanations
for the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate: 1) the Ninth Circuit is the largest appellate court
in terms of both territory and authorized judgeships, and 2) the Ninth Circuit's reputation
as a liberal court. The size explanation essentially addresses the functionality of the
circuit, directly or indirectly evaluating whether the Ninth Circuit should be split. The
question of the Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation highlights differences between the Ninth
Circuit and the Supreme Court that may be contributing to the Ninth Circuit's frequent
reversal by the Supreme Court. The results of this study indicate a pronounced difference
injudicial behavior between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court that suggests that
the circuit's output is a very strong explanation for the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate.
The cases reviewed in this study reveal significant differences between the Ninth Circuit
and the Supreme Court in their respective approaches towards applying law.
This study examined the cases from the Ninth Circuit reviewed by the Supreme
Court during an eleven-year period of consistent Supreme Court membership to
determine whether the cases highlighted particular patterns of judicial behavior. This
study focused on three different aspects of these cases: 1) the composition of the Ninth
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Circuit panel, to test whether the composition of Democrat-appointed or Republicanappointed judges on the panel affected the reversal rate; 2) the presence of government or
a government representative as appellant or appellee on the case, to assess if there was a
difference between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court in their respective treatment
of government interests; and 3) the application of the due process clause, to test
differences between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court in their respective
approaches towards a type of law. The results from this analysis suggest that the
relationship between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court is more complex than the
political reputation of the Ninth Circuit implies.
The Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation is frequently defined as a function of
political (rather than legal) ideology. The "liberal judge" theory stems from President
Carter's fifteen Ninth Circuit appointments, and it attributes the Ninth Circuit's frequent
reversal to a political conflict with a Supreme Court composed mostly of Republicanappointed justices. The theory, however, does not hold up to review. During the 19942005 period of this study, the number of unanimous Supreme Court reversals far
exceeded the 5-4 or 6-3 reversals that would be consistent with an ideological
explanation. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate is consistent across different
panel compositions. These results demonstrate that the political definitions of liberal and
conservative (viewed as a Democrat vs. Republican conflict) cannot adequately explain
the differences between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court. However, this study
indicated notable differences between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court in their
treatment of government appellants or appellees and in their application of the due
process guarantees, which highlights liberal and conservative judicial (or philosophical)
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differences. The Supreme Court is far more likely than the Ninth Circuit to support the
government's position when the government appears as a party to the case. When the
Supreme Court favored the government's position, it reversed the Ninth Circuit in 92% of
cases; the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate improves substantially when the Supreme Court
ruled against the government appellant. In 88.6% of cases invoking a due process
protection, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's position; the majority of these
cases were reversed by the Supreme Court in favor of government.
As supported by the statistical tests in treatment of government as a party and the
application of Due Process law, significant judicial philosophy differences exist between
the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court. These differences exist across party lines. The
treatment of government appellants and the application of due process guarantees are
concepts of judicial behavior that are not strictly defined in partisan terms. In not
favoring a government appellant or in extending a due process guarantee, the Ninth
Circuit may be exercising a "liberal" philosophy without being representative of either
appointing presidential party. The judicial approach favored by the Ninth Circuit may
apply broadly to the circuit's judges independent of the judge's political identification, as
indicated by the consistency in reversal rate across different panel compositions.
Additionally, because a circuit's output is heavily influenced by its own precedent, unless
governed by existing Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit may be applying a
technically "correct" approach to law which conflicts with the Supreme Court's approach
to the same legal question.1
A difference injudicial philosophy between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court, as evidence by the Ninth Circuit's "liberal" outcomes towards government
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appellants and the due process cases suggests a more complex distinction between the
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court than the "liberal judge" theory allowed. The
philosophical, rather than political (or ideological) explanation of the Ninth Circuit's
"liberal" approach and the Supreme Court's "conservative" approach explains how Ninth
Circuit panels composed primarily of Republican-appointed judges are reversed at a
similar rate as panels composed mostly of Democratic-appointed judges. It also accounts
for the frequency of unanimous reversals by the Supreme Court. The philosophical
difference also indicates that politicizing the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate has little overall
benefit, because the Republican-appointed judges are part of the Ninth Circuit's "liberal"
problem. While this explanation provides a greater understanding of the relationship
between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, it also indicates that if corrective
measures to lower the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate are necessary, such a shift will not be
accomplished primarily by balancing the composition of judges.
This study approached the question of the Ninth Circuit's judicial reputation by
focusing on the Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court. By examining all
the cases accepted for review by the Supreme Court, this study discovered patterns within
the cases rather than focusing on broad reversal statistics or notable cases. Further
studies can apply this approach towards the other regional circuit courts of appeal, to
contrast the relationship between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court to the
relationship between its sister circuits and the Supreme Court. A study on the effects of
panel composition can apply the same approach used to test the "liberal judge"
hypothesis here to other circuit courts to examine the relationship between judicial
partisan identification and the circuit's reversal rate. Further research should also be
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directed towards the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. While the ideological explanation
does not withstand statistical scrutiny, further assessment of the philosophical differences
suggested by this paper is merited to understand the relationship between the Ninth
Circuit, the Supreme Court, and the other circuit courts.
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APPENDIX

LIST OF NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES, 1994-2005

The following table lists the judges who served in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in either an active circuit judge or senior circuit judge capacity (or both) during
the period of this study. This list does not include the judges whose service to the Ninth
Circuit concluded prior to 1994, or who were appointed after 2005.

Judge Name
Chambers, Richard
Merrill, Charles
Browning, James
Wright, Eugene
Kilkenny, John
Cho, Herbert
Goodwin, Alfred
Wallace, Clifford
Sneed, Joseph
Hug, Procter
Tang, Thomas
Fletcher, Betty
Schroeder, Mary
Skopil, Otto
Farris, Joseph
Alarcon, Arthur
Pregerson, Harry
Ferguson, Warren
Poole, Cecil
Nelson, Dorothy
Canby, William
Boochever, Robert
Norris, William

Appointed
By
Eisenhower
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Nixon
Nixon
Nixon
Nixon
Nixon
Nixon
Carter
Carter
Carter
Carter
Carter
Carter
Carter
Carter
Carter
Carter
Carter
Carter
Carter
Carter
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Year
Appointed
1954
1959
1961
1969
1969
1971
1971
1972
1973
1977
1977
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1980
1980
1980

Senior
Status
1976
1974
2000
1983
1971
1984
1991
1996
1987
2002
1993
1998
2011
1986
1995
1992

End of
Service
1994
1996
2012
2002
1995
2004
-

-

2008
-

1995
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1986
1996
1995
1996
1986
1994

2008
1997
-

-

2011
1997

Judge Name

Appointed
By
Reinhardt, Stephen
Carter
Beezer, Robert
Reagan
Hall, Cynthia
Reagan
Wiggins, Charles
Reagan
Brunetti, Melvin
Reagan
Kozinski, Alex
Reagan
Noonan, John
Reagan
Thompson, David
Reagan
O'Scannlain, Diarmuid Reagan
Leavy, Edward
Reagan
Trott, Stephen
Reagan
Fernandez, Ferdinand
H.W. Bush
Rymer, Pamela
H.W. Bush
Nelson, Thomas
H.W. Bush
Kleinfeld, Andrew
H.W. Bush
Hawkins, Michael
Clinton
Tashima, Atsushi
Clinton
Thomas, Sidney
Clinton
Silverman, Barry
Clinton
Graber, Susan
Clinton
McKeown, Margaret
Clinton
Wardlaw, Kim
Clinton
Fletcher, William
Clinton
Fisher, Raymond
Clinton
Gould, Ronald
Clinton
Paez, Richard
Clinton
Berzon, Marsha
Clinton
Tallman, Richard
Clinton
Rawlinson, Johnnie
Clinton
Clifton, Richard
G.W. Bush
Bybee, Jay
G.W. Bush
Callahan, Consuelo
G.W. Bush
Bea, Carlos
G.W. Bush
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Year
Appointed
1980
1984
1984
1984
1985
1985
1985
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1989
1990
1991
1994
1996
1996
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2002
2003
2003
2003

Senior
Status

End of
Service

-

-

1996
1997
1996
1999

2012
2011
2000
2009

-

-

1996
1998

2011

-

-

1997
2004
2002
-

2003
2010
2010
2004

-

-

-

-

2011
2011
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

